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Aristotle on justice in exchange: 





Abstract. This essay offers an interpretation of Aristotle's remarks 
on the commensurability of goods in Book V of the Nicomachean 
Ethics. It explores the term ‘by hypothesis’ (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως) which 
Aristotle uses to describe the institution of currency through 
which commensurability is established. The term implies that 
Aristotle conceives the origins of currency to lie in a conscious act 
of stipulation rather than through a spontaneous process in which 
currency is established via the unintended consequences of 
individual action. In conclusion, contemporary theories of money 
are considered and it is asked with which Aristotle’s conception of 
money aligns most closely. 
 






This essay offers an interpretation of an aspect of Aristotle’s remarks on 
commensurability in the Nicomachean Ethics (Nic. Eth.). It attends to a term 
that has received much scholarly attention in the context of Aristotle’s logical 
works but not in the context of Nic. Eth. The term, ‘by hypothesis’ (ἐξ 
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ὑποθέσεως), is used by Aristotle to describe the way in which currency, qua unit 
for measuring  the value of goods, is established (1133b21). After considering 
Aristotle’s analysis of commensurability, the term by hypothesis is examined 
along with its cognate noun, hypothesis (ὑπόθεσις), as they are used in 
Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics. Aristotle’s usage of the term in the 
Analytics sheds light on his discussion of commensurability in Nic. Eth. Many 
interpreters use ‘by convention’ or a close synonym to translate ἐξ ὑποθέσεως in 
Nic. Eth. The many meanings of ‘convention’, however, engender ambiguity 
which can mislead. The ambiguity is captured in definition 9a of the Oxford 
English Dictionary in which ‘convention’ is defined as ‘[g]eneral agreement or 
consent, deliberate or implicit, as constituting the origin and foundation of any 
custom, institution, opinion, etc.’.[1] The ‘deliberate/implicit’ opposition makes 
for ambiguity, for a convention, custom, institution, etc. can be established 
deliberately – according to a plan or as a result of explicit agreement – but 
conventions can also arise implicitly – without design and therefore not as a 
result of explicit agreement. We think of natural languages and many of their 
rules when we think of conventions arising in this second, ‘implicit’, sense. The 
‘invisible hand’ processes through which such conventions come into being are 
named after Adam Smith’s adage about the promotion of the general good via 
individuals’ intentions to promote only their own gain (Smith, 1976/1776, 
IV.ii.9). This understanding of convention is popular amongst economists in 
their attempts to explain the emergence of social institutions. A canonical 
example brings us close to the topic of this essay, for it concerns the origin of 
money (Menger, 1871). The ‘implicit’ conception of convention is not an 
appropriate way to approach to Aristotle’s account of the origins of currency. 
For Aristotle, if something is established by hypothesis, it follows from a formal 
agreement, explicitly laid down. The subject is the term kata sunthēkēn (κατὰ 
συνθήκην), with which Aristotle describes the way in which currency comes to 
serve as a representative of need (Nic. Eth. 1133a29). The term kata sunthēkēn, 
like ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, is often rendered by Aristotle’s translators as ‘by convention’. 
The term should, however, like ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, be interpreted as a formal 
agreement rather than as an implicitly arising convention. The essay concludes 
with reflections on Aristotle and modern theories of money. In this section, 
what Aristotle means by the terms commonly translated as ‘exchange’ are subject 
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to scrutiny, whereby it is argued that his terms for exchange are far more 
encompassing than the modern understanding of market exchange suggests. It is 
argued that Aristotle’s discussion of ‘justice in exchange’ in Nic. Eth. addresses 
types of exchange which go beyond the scope of market exchange. 
 
 
Commensurability and justice in exchange 
 
For Aristotle, commensurability is the foundation of the community: a 
community or association cannot exist without exchange, for its individuals are 
not self-sufficient. If exchange is to be just, the items exchanged must be 
equalized, for which there must be a measure according to which goods are 
valued. Of this measure Aristotle (Nic. Eth., 1133a19-20) writes: 
 
All items for exchange must be comparable in some way. Currency has 
come along to do exactly this, and in this way it becomes an 
intermediate, since it measures everything, and so measures excess and 
deficiency – how many shoes are equal to a house.[2] 
 
He adds  (Nic. Eth., 1133a26-31): 
 
In reality, this measure is need, which holds everything together.... And 
currency has become a sort of pledge of need (chreia), kata sunthēkēn; 
in fact it has its name (nomisma) because it is not by nature, but by the 
current law (nomos), and it is within our power to alter it and to make 
it useless 
 
Though things so different cannot become commensurate in reality, they 
can become commensurate enough in relation to our needs. Hence there 
must be some single unit fixed ἐξ ὑποθέσεως. This is why it is called 
currency; for this makes everything commensurate, since everything is 
measured by currency (Nic. Eth., 1133b18-23). 
 
For the time being, two phrases – kata sunthēkēn and ἐξ ὑποθέσεως – will be 
left untranslated. Both phrases have been translated as ‘by convention’, though, 
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other translations exist. In the second of the three passages quoted above, 
Aristotle tells us that need is the measure, whereas, in the third, it is 
currency.[3] Neither ‘solution’ to the problem of commensurability is free of 
philosophical difficulty (Gallagher, 2012; Meikle, 1995), though many scholars, 
Meikle (1995) being a notable exception, see the need solution as Aristotle’s final 
word on the matter of establishing commensurability (Finley, 1970; Judson, 
1997; Will, 1954). Aristotle does not explain how currency becomes a 
‘representative’ or ‘pledge’ (hupallagma) of need, but he does make clear that it is 
currency which does the measuring, even if currency is subordinate to need (Nic. 
Eth., 1119b26-27): 
 
We call wealth (chrēmata) anything whose worth is measured by 
money. 
 
Money is supplied as a common measure; everything is related to this 
and measured by it (Nic. Eth., 1164a1-2). 
 
Currency, for Aristotle, is a human invention, its purpose to measure the value 
of different goods in exchange. While pronouncing on the function of currency 
as a measure (and as a store of value which allows for deferred payment (Nic. 
Eth., 1133b10-13)), Aristotle does not examine its historical origin. The verbs he 
uses with currency (nomisma) draw attention to currency’s existence: nomisma, 
he writes, ‘came along’ (elēluthe) (Nic. Eth., 1133a20)  in order to make all goods 
comparable (sumblēta); currency must ‘exist’ (einai) (1133b19), lest exchangeable 
goods be incommensurable (summetra) and exchange thus unjust (Nic. Eth., 
1133b16); currency is ‘provided’ (peporistai) (Nic. Eth., 1164a2) as a measure. 
These verbs remain vague about a historical act of establishing currency. 
 
Aristotle states that it is impossible ‘in reality’ (alētheia) (Nic. Eth., 1133b19) 
for diverse goods to become commensurable. If commensurability exists, its 
source lies outside the nature of the goods exchanged; goods, that is, can only be 
commensurable ἐξ ὑποθέσεως – ‘by hypothesis’.  My purpose, in the two sections 
which follow, is to explore the terms left untranslated when citing Aristotle 
above. The first, ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, will be the focus of the section following two 
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subsections, whilst the second, κατὰ συνθήκην, which Aristotle uses in his 
discussion of need, is the subject of a subsequent section. 
 
ἐξ ὑποθέσεως (‘by hypothesis’) 
Let us start with the noun, hypothesis (ὑπόθεσις), the literal meaning of which 
is ‘something laid down (under)’, Its many meanings in Aristotle will be 
reviewed later, [4] but here, we examine the technical approach to hypothesis as 
an element of logical argument in the Posterior Analytics (Post. An.). It should 
be noted that, when the term is transliterated into a Romanised form – 
hypothesis – the word will be  italicized to alert the reader to the danger of 
misconceiving the Greek term if one associates with the English word 
‘hypothesis’. As we will see, that there is, for Aristotle, nothing necessarily 
‘hypothetical’ about a hypothesis. 
  
Aristotle defines a hypothesis as a type of ‘posit’ (thesis) that assumes one or 
other part of a statement (apophansis). That is, we have a hypothesis if we 
assume either that ‘X is (exists)’ or ‘X is not’ (Post. An., 72a9-24). [5] Aristotle 
alludes to a learning situation in which a statement is a hypothesis for the pupil 
if she assumes the statement to be true and provable without either proving it 
herself or having it proven to her. Such a hypothesis has validity relative to the 
learner (Post. An., 76b23-34). If the learner holds no opinion about the truth of 
the statement concerned, or if she opposes it, the statement is not a hypothesis 
but a ‘postulate’ (aitēma). Because it is provable, a hypothesis is not ‘merely 
hypothetical’, in the modern English sense, that is, something conjectural or of 
uncertain validity (Wallace, 1981, p. 52; Wolfsdorf, 2008, p. 44).  And because it 
is provable, a hypothesis differs from a ‘fundamental principle’ (archē), for a 
fundamental principle is ‘immediate’ and therefore not amenable to proof, that 
is, not derivable from something else (Post. An., 72a6-8; Metaphysics, 1005b14) 
(see Upton, 1985, pp. 287-288). 
 
In the Prior Analytics (Pr. An., I. 23, 29, 44), the term by hypothesis appears in 
Aristotle’s discussion of ‘syllogisms by hypothesis’ (συλλογισμόι ἐξ ὑποθέσεως). 
These syllogisms proceed when one’s interlocutor, I, agrees to accept a 
proposition, q, on the condition that another proposition, p, be proven to her. ‘If  
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p then q’ is the hypothesis here, and once p is deduced, I must accept q (Lear, 
1980, p. 34; Strobach, 2001, p. 251). Aristotle offers an example (Pr. An., I. 44, 
50a20-28) which involves two negative propositions, the first of which is deduced 
syllogistically, the second laid down by hypothesis. [6] The first proposition, ~p, 
is: ‘not every capacity (dunamis) is of contraries’. This proposition is amenable to 
logical demonstration. [7] The second proposition, ~q, is: not every science 
(epistēmē) is of contraries’. The hypothesis upon which the protagonists agree is: 
~p → ~q, that is, if one accepts ‘not p’ (or ~p), then one must accept ‘not q’ (or ~q). 
Once the hypothesis, ~p → ~q, is accepted, one’s interlocutor is honour-bound, as 
it were, to accept that ‘not every science is of contraries’ once it has been 
demonstrated that not every capacity is of contraries. Whilst ~q may, like ~p, be 
amenable to logical demonstration, in the case at hand, it is not demonstrated 
but assumed by the hypothesis: ~p → ~q. 
 
Other syllogisms by hypothesis are reductiones ad impossibile which involve an 
agreement to the hypothesis in advance of the demonstration to be given, as in 
the following example from the commentary on Pr. An. by Alexander of 
Aphrodisias (259, 20-29). If one wishes to deduce that ‘no human can fly’, one 
hypothesises the opposite, viz., ‘some humans can fly’. One adds to this the 
generally accepted premise: ‘all flying things have wings’, and one deduces the 
conclusion (if one has postulated that ‘some humans can fly’): ‘therefore some 
humans have wings’. The obvious falsity of the conclusion leads one to reject the 
hypothesis (‘some humans can fly’), and so the opposite claim – ‘no human can 
fly’ – stands accepted. 
 
The foregoing exposition is but a schematic presentation of what Aristotle means 
by hypothesis, and it does not do justice to the complexity of Aristotle’s 
discussion. It nevertheless serves the present purpose of showing whence the term 
by hypothesis comes. We may summarise by listing three facets of the term as 
follows: 
 
i) In syllogisms by hypothesis, the hypothesis takes the form of a 
‘concession’ (homologia) (Pr. An., I. 23, 41a40) on the part of the disputants who 
agree to the hypothesis. One party stipulates the hypothesis to which the other 
must agree if the demonstration is to proceed. 
Peacock, Mark (2016), 'Aristotle on justice in exchange: commensurability by fiat',  
The Journal of Philosophical Economics: Reflections on Economic and Social Issues, 
X: 1, 5-27 
 
The Journal of Philosophical Economics X: 1 (2016)   11 
 
ii) The agreement described is made in advance of the demonstration and is 
a presupposition of the latter. Taking this and the foregoing point together, we 
may say there is an explicit, conscious act of laying down what one is assuming 
in advance of the demonstration. [8] 
 
iii) A hypothesis is not derived from anything prior, and although it may be 
susceptible to derivation, its function in syllogisms by hypothesis is to provide 
the ground for what follows. 
With this in mind, we may pursue the meaning of by hypothesis in Aristotle’s 
ethical and political works. 
  
By hypothesis in the Nicomachean Ethics 
The following analysis is based on the hypothesis (!) that by hypothesis in Nic. 
Eth. is used analogously to its use in the Analytics. Aristotle’s use of the same 
term in different works is thus not coincidental, and the sense of by hypothesis 
in the Analytics gives us a clue to its sense in Nic. Eth. Aristotle does not give a 
detailed explanation concerning arguments by hypothesis in the Analytics, 
something usually attributed to his audience’s familiarity with hypotheses, as 
expounded in Plato’s Meno (86e-89c) (cf. Striker, 1979, p. 34), in which Socrates 
proves that excellence is a variety of knowledge with the aid of the hypothesis 
that, if excellence is knowledge, it must be teachable (89c). Socrates likens his 
use of hypothetical argument with regard to excellence to its use in geometry 
(86e). To approach Aristotle’s use of by hypothesis in Nic. Eth. the following 
paragraphs examine his use of the term in other, related, works by Aristotle. 
 
In the Eudemian Ethics (Eud. Eth.), Aristotle states that deliberation does not 
extend to the end (telos) of action in the productive or fabricating arts 
(poiētikais) because in these arts, one deliberates about means with an end 
already in sight; the end, here, is described as the foundation (archē) and 
hypothesis of action (Eud. Eth., 1227a9-10, 1227b29-30). Aristotle does not, as he 
does elsewhere, distinguish here between hypothesis and archē, according to 
their derivability or immediateness (Post. An., 72a6-24; cf. Metaphysics 1005b); 
his point is that the end is a given presupposition of action. Aristotle gives the 
example of a doctor, for whom it is given, like a hypothesis, that a patient 
should be made healthy; this is not a matter on which doctors deliberate, for 
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only the means to make a patient healthy are subject to deliberation (Eud. Eth., 
1227b25-6). Aristotle repeats this thought in Nic. Eth. (1151a15-19), when he 
describes the incontinent person: 
 
For virtue preserves the origin (archē), while vice corrupts it; and in 
action the end we act for is the origin, as the assumptions (hypotheseis) 
are the origins in mathematics. Reason does not teach the origins in 
either mathematics or in actions; [with actions], it is virtue, either 
natural or habituated, that teaches correct belief about the origin. 
 
It is, as it were, virtue which provides the first principles of action, and hence 
the virtuous person does not have to deliberate about the end of action. 
 
In the Politics (Pol.), Aristotle avails himself numerous times of the term 
hypothesis. Sometimes, hypothesis refers to an assumption or premise of an 
argument (Pol., 1261a16-17, 1263b30, 1329a21). It is also used in the sense of a 
principle which stands behind a concept or institution, e.g. the principle of 
aristocracy, democracy or of a polity (Pol., 1269a33, 1273a4, 1317a36, 40, 
1328b39); here, as in Eud. Eth. cited in the previous paragraph, Aristotle uses 
hypothesis as synonymous with archē (origin). Hypothesis can refer, too, to the 
principle behind a taxonomy or the headings of a classificatory scheme (Pol., 
1300b14, 1314a26). In three places in the Politics, Aristotle uses the term by 
hypothesis. At Pol. 1332a8-12, he refers the reader to Nic. Eth. (1098a16) and its 
view that happiness (eudaimonia) is the complete realization and exercise of 
virtue. He is at pains to let the reader know that this fact is not ‘conditional’ (by 
hypothesis) but rather true without qualification (haplōs) or necessarily 
(tanagkaia). Aristotle also notes that children are not citizens in the same way 
as adults; children are only citizens by hypothesis (Pol., 1278a5). The two latter 
uses of by hypothesis signify that something is conditional or subject to 
qualification. They resemble his use of by hypothesis in the discussion of 
commensurability in Nic. Eth. There, as we noted, goods are not commensurable 
in reality but are so under a certain condition, that condition being when the 
values of those goods are considered according to the measure of currency. 
 
Drawing Aristotle’s uses of by hypothesis together, then, and applying them to 
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his discussion of commensurability in Nic. Eth., we may say that Aristotle 
understands the coming into being of currency by hypothesis as follows: 
currency arises through explicit agreement; it is stipulated and agreed to as a 
measure of value, and its existence is a presupposition of the commensurability 
of goods which only become commensurable conditionally, that is, relative to the 
hypothesis through which currency comes into existence. The italicised words in 
the foregoing give us three aspects of by hypothesis – agreement, stipulation and 
presupposition. All are to be found in translations of by hypothesis in Nic. Eth. 
Although some translators translate by hypothesis as ‘by convention’, the term is 
most often translated into English as ‘agreement’, though ‘stipulation’ is also 
common, and ‘presupposition’ less so. The fourth aspect of by hypothesis – the 
conditionality aspect – is captured in translations of the term not only as ‘by 
stipulation’, but also as ‘by arbitrary usage’. The ‘arbitrariness’ of the hypothesis 
captures the conditionality of commensurability, for goods are not by nature 
commensurable but have to be made thus by some stipulation which is arbitrary 
relative to the nature of the goods themselves. [9] 
 
Only if agreement is understood to be an explicit and conscious act of assent does 
it concur with the assent given to a hypothesis in syllogisms by hypothesis of 
Aristotle’s Analytics, where the interlocutor or pupil agrees to accept a 
hypothesis proposed by the instructor. Let us now turn to the other term - κατὰ 
συνθήκην – which is mentioned by Aristotle in his discussion of 
commensurability and which, too, is often translated as ‘by convention’. 
 
Need and ‘kata sunthēkēn’ 
Aristotle’s need solution to commensurability, which was referred to, proposes 
that exchangeable items are made commensurable – sufficiently, at least, for the 
purpose of assuring justice in exchange – in relation to people’s need. Currency, 
according to this view, arises as a ‘representative’ or ‘pledge’ (hupallagma) of 
need. Currency comes to represent need kata sunthēkēn (Nic. Eth., 1133a29). 
Like the term by hypothesis, kata sunthēkēn has the sense of an agreement, 
though ‘convention’ is also offered as a translation.[10] Let us explore the 
connotations of kata sunthēkēn by looking at its use in other parts of the 
Aristotelian opus. 
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In the Politics, the noun sunthēkē signifies a formal compact between allies 
(Pol., 1280a38, 1284a40). It is synonymous with summachia (alliance, usually 
military) and sumbolon (treaty) (Pol., 1280a39-40).[11] Aristotle also avails 
himself of the term sunthēkē in the passage immediately after his discussion of 
commensurability in Nic. Eth. In discussing political justice, he observes that 
what is ‘legal and conventional’ (nomikon kai sunthēkē) (Nic. Eth., 1134b32) 
changes according to the constitution of the polis in which law is made. 
‘Conventional’ is a reasonable translation of sunthēkē here if it carries the sense 
of formal agreement (cf. de Ste. Croix, 2004, pp. 328-329). With regard to justice, 
Aristotle tells us, those things which are ‘just by agreement and expediency’ (ta 
de kata sunthēkēn kaito sumpheron tōn dikaiōn) (Nic. Eth., 1134b35), are 
analogous to weights and measures, for they vary from place to place. Indeed, 
this is the case of political constitutions generally, for they differ from one 
another. The important point for our discussion is the sense of kata sunthēkēn 
as ‘by agreement’, for weights and measures in Greek poleis were ‘prescribed by 
law’ (de Ste. Croix, 2004, p. 329). The formally stipulated and enforced weights 
and measures make it obvious that any institution which is ‘just by agreement 
and expediency’ must, like the norms of Greek metrology, be formally laid down 
and agreed.   
 
As in the case of by hypothesis, then, sunthēkē and kata sunthēkēn are best 
understood in the sense of a formal agreement or pact (Liddel and Scott, 1996). 
This concurs with Aristotle’s use of sunthēkē in the Prior Analytics. when he 
states that the premises of hypothetical syllogisms are not amenable to analysis 
but are ‘conceded by agreement’ (alla dia sunthēkēs hōmologēmenos) (Pr. An., I. 
44, 50a17-18). Sunthēkē here signifies the prior agreement that parties give to a 
particular hypothesis, usually in an explicit way. As Walter Leszl (1981, p. 316) 
writes, in some cases ‘the term hypothesis is treated as synonymous with 
homologia or with sunthēkē, in evident allusion to the agreement that is 
presupposed by or reached in a dialectical debate’. We may therefore conclude 
that Aristotle describes the representation of need by currency kata sunthēkēn to 
indicate that this representation is based on formal agreement. The way in 
which the representation ensues may be deemed ‘conventional’ in that it might 
differ from polis to polis, but the explicitness of the agreement is unmistakeable. 
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We have therefore reached the conclusion that Aristotle's term by hypothesis 
implies a formal act of deliberate establishment. But Aristotle does not offer us 
further details about how the unit which denominates value is established. The 
following summary provides a characterization of the way in which the measure 
that currency provides (Nic. Eth., 1133b20-1) comes into being: 
 
Just exchange within a community presupposes a measure of the value 
of goods. This measure is currency which exists for the purpose of 
providing a common unit and thus of making goods commensurable. 
The commensurability effected by currency is neither a consequence of 
the nature of goods, nor is it the product of a convention if the latter is 
understood in its ‘implicit’ sense. Currency and the ensuing 
commensurability are arbitrary stipulations. Once the members of the 
community have agreed to this stipulation, exchangers can ascertain 
whether the goods they proffer in exchange are of equal value to those 
they accept in return. There will thus be justice in exchange. 
 
 
Conclusion: Aristotle, ‘exchange’ and modern theories of money 
 
Prima facie, Aristotle’s discussion of currency in the Nicomachean Ethics has, 
as its focus, market exchange within the political community. This, at least, is 
how most commentators understand the fifth book of the Nicomachean Ethics. 
If this interpretation is correct, currency thus manifests itself as a medium of 
exchange in Aristotle’s work, yet anterior to this function of currency is its 
function of unit of account. Without a unit which ensures commensurability of 
the things exchanged, there can be no justice in exchange, and hence the unit is 
a presupposition of just exchange. Hence Aristotle’s analysis in the 
Nicomachean Ethics aligns itself with those modern analyses of money for 
which the unit of account function is primary. J. M. Keynes’ (1930, pp. 3-5) is 
one such analysis, for it states that ‘MONEY-OF-ACCOUNT ... is the primary 
concept of a Theory of Money’. Keynes was influenced by the ‘Chartalist’ (or 
state) theory of money, developed to its highest form in the twentieth century by 
Georg Friedrich Knapp (1923), for whom the unit account function of money is 
also of prime importance to money’s use as a means of payment. The Chartalist 
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theory has recently been revived in modern economics (see, e.g.,  Wray, 1998; 
2012). Aristotle, as argued above, holds that the unit of measure – currency – is 
stipulated by agreement (by hypothesis). 
 
In contrast to Aristotle’s account on currency in the Nicomanchean Ethics, the 
account he offers in Book I of the Politics focuses on the origins of money in the 
context of long-distance trade. The explanation of money in the Politics makes 
no reference to justice but instead to convenience: currency overcomes the 
obstacles to exchange when the latter is conducted as barter. This account seems 
to align itself more closely to the orthodox economic position that money arises 
in the context of market exchange, whereby a particularly ‘saleable’ commodity 
becomes the dominant medium of exchange (cf. Menger, 1871). Aristotle might 
then be held to have two theories on the origin of money. One might hold these 
views to be mutually incompatible, but before one ascribes inconsistency to 
Aristotle, one should note two things. First, his analysis of currency follows a 
tradition in Greek thought which divides exchange within the political 
community (the subject of the Nicomachean Ethics)  from external exchange or 
long-distance trade between different communities (the subject of the Politics).  
 
In Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey, long-distance trade (emporia) is well attested, 
with the Phoenicians being  its main purveyors. Trade amongst Greeks who 
inhabit different political communities, or amongst Greeks living in the same 
political community, is, on the other hand, scarcely attested in Homer (Peacock, 
2011). Hesiod’s Works and Days follows a similar pattern, whereby trade within 
the community of Ascra is not attested, though Hesiod has much advice for the 
long-distance trader. The distinction between the internal and external 
movement of goods stretches its tentacles into the classical period in which Plato 
and Aristotle wrote (fourth century BCE). It is reflected in the distinction in 
terminology for ‘retail traders’ (kapēloi), who hawk their goods within the 
political community, and long-distance traders (emporoi) (Peacock, 2016). 
Aristotle can be placed into this tradition of ancient Greek thought. In the 
Ethics, Aristotle is concerned with justice in the context of intra-community 
exchange, for the cohesion of the community depends thereon. But justice is not 
a concern in the context of long-distance trade. 
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There is thus a decisive difference between the two types of exchange – intra-
community and long-distance. One may even say that Aristotle’s two discussion 
of money do not pertain to the same thing. To support this argument, the types 
of exchange to which Aristotle refers will be examined; for whereas long-
distance trade (as discussed in the Politics) answers to the name of commerce, 
the exchange which forms the context for the discussion of currency in the 
Nicomachean Ethics is not so easily subsumed under the heading of commercial 
activity. One can provide support for this statement by considering the 
terminology with which Aristotle describes ‘exchange’. 
 
There are numerous terms, all used in Book V of Nic. Eth., which can be (and 
are) translated as ‘exchange’: allaktikais (Nic. Eth., 1132b32), metadosis (Nic. 
Eth., 1133a2), antidosin (Nic. Eth., 1133a6), metadidonai (Nic. Eth., 1133a10), 
allagē (Nic. Eth., 1132b13, 1133a19, 24, 28, 1133b11, 15, 17, 26). Let us 
investigate the connotation of these terms to descry the extension of what we 
ascribe to Aristotle with the term ‘exchange’. 
 
The first, allaktikais, refers not only to commercial exchange but also to the 
exchange of gifts (cf. Plato’s Sophist, 223c). Gift exchange was both a 
Mycenaean and an archaic (Homeric) practice amongst the Greek élite, and 
there are good reasons for holding that the aim of the practice was not the 
making of profit at the expense of one’s gift-exchanging partners. Rather, gift 
exchange was a method of conducting ‘foreign policy’ (Donlan, 1982, p. 149), 
whereby the leader of a wealthy estate (oikos) cemented friendly and peaceful 
relations with others who might live at some distance. This is not market 
exchange as understood in contemporary or ancient societies. 
 
The second term with which Aristotle describes exchange is metadosis. The term 
is used three times in the Politics. In one instance it describes pre-monetary 
exchange (barter) between independent families or peoples (1257a24). A second 
instance comes in the context of a comparison between a true political 
community and an ‘alliance’ (summachia): people who live in proximity to one 
another and regulate their doings in a way that prevents wrongdoing in their 
exchanges (metadoseis) would not, Aristotle insists, constitute a political 
community (Pol., 1280b18-24). Aristotle continues: 
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Let us suppose that one man is a carpenter, another a farmer, another a 
shoemaker, and so on, and that their number is ten thousand: 
nevertheless if they have nothing in common but exchange, alliance, 
and the like, that would not constitute a state (polis). 
 
A polis, Aristotle writes, does not consist merely in people sharing a common 
place with the purpose of avoiding mutual harm and for the sake of exchanging 
goods; rather a polis is a community of families which exists for the sake of 
complete and self-sufficient life (Pol., 1280b30-31). The passage applies to the 
exchangers Aristotle describes in Nic. Eth. who are not mere exchangers of goods 
looking out only for their own interest in their transactions, for if they were, 
they would constitute only an alliance of people. To constitute a polis 
presupposes friendship between them and the aim of a good and happy life (Pol., 
1280b38-1281a1). This conception of the polis will occupy us again presently, but 
first we must attend to Aristotle’s terms for exchange. Metadosis, in the sections 
of the Politics just cited, clearly refers to mercantile affairs. Does this imply 
that his use of metadosis at Nic. Eth. (1133a2) likewise refers to commercial 
exchange? The answer is ‘no’, and that for the following reasons: 
 
i) Metadosis may include mercantile exchange but it is not limited to its 
sense of commerce. Elsewhere (Pol. 1321a26), Aristotle uses the term in the 
sense of allowing a share in something (specifically, allowing the people a share 
in the running of government). [12] 
 
ii) In Nic. Eth. (Book V), in which metadosis is used, Aristotle refers to 
the grouping in which exchangers are held together. The group is not an 
‘alliance’, in the sense just described, but a community (koinonia) or a polis. 
This implies that the sense of exchange to which he refers with the word 
metadosis stretches beyond commercial exchange, for Nic. Eth. is not concerned 
with mere alliances but with communities based on friendship which exist for 
the purpose of pursuing a good and happy life. 
 
Taking (i) and (ii) together, we may hypothesise that Aristotle’s use of metadosis 
in Nic. Eth. takes on the broad meaning of sharing rather than the narrow 
meaning of commercial exchange. This can be appreciated better if we consider 
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the context of Aristotle’s use of metadosin. 
 
Immediately after Aristotle uses the term metadosis, he adds the following 
comment, one of the least analysed in his remarks on exchange: 
 
that is why they make a temple of the Graces prominent, so that there 
will be a return of benefits received. For this is what is special to grace; 
when someone has been gracious to us, we must do a service for him in 
return (Nic. Eth. 1133a2-5). 
 
The three Graces (Charites) were goddesses whose name is derived from the 
ancient Greek word for grace (χάρις), which designates a type of pleasure of 
benefit. Charis signifies a convention of reciprocity, whereby the receipt of a 
favour or benefaction is to be reciprocated (MacLachlan, 1993, chapter 1). 
Commentators often relate charis to the sort of reciprocity involved in gift 
exchange (MacLachlan, 1993; Wilkinson, 2013). One of few commentators to 
have treated this allusion to the Graces in detail and to have integrated it into 
the analysis of justice in exchange is Robert Gallagher (forthcoming), who 
offers an ingenious analysis to the equalisation involved in exchange, as 
Aristotle perceives it. The reader is referred to Gallagher’s essay, but here it is 
merely noted that Gallagher’s analysis coheres with that of the present essay, for 
Gallagher’s solution to the riddle of proportionate reciprocity in exchange 
implies that ‘Aristotle reaches outside the realm of the material to social goods 
to complete the transaction’ (p. 13). That is, Aristotle’s understanding of 
exchange (here, metadosin) is not to be understood as market exchange in the 
conventional modern sense. The reason for this is that exchange between 
members of the same community should involve reciprocity between the 
exchangers which is not accomplished if one considers only the value of the 
products they are to exchange. 
 
Antidosin is the next term for exchange to be considered. It is used but once in 
Nic. Eth., Book V. The term has a technical sense in Athenian law (Christ 
1990), the context for which concerns the public benefactions or liturgies which 
the wealthiest Athenians were obliged to make for the benefit of the polis. 
Aristotle is not adverting to this sense in Nic. Eth. Metadidonai (1133a10) is 
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another term which refers to exchange. It is used not only in Nic. Eth., Book V, 
but also during the discussion of friendship. Like metadosis, metadidonai 
connotes sharing. At Nic. Eth. 1171b, it refers to sharing of one’s bad fortune 
with friends, whilst at 1177a8-9, it is used to convey the idea that a slave does 
not share (partake) in happiness. Again, a purely mercantile meaning cannot be 
ascribed to the term, and this counsels a look beyond what is conventionally 
considered to be market exchange when we interpret Aristotle.   
 
The final term for exchange, allagē(s), stems from the verb allassō (to change, 
alter) and is the word Aristotle most frequently uses for exchange in Nic. Eth. It 
refers to the exchange of goods (as in Plato’s Republic 371b), and Aristotle uses 
it at Nic. Eth. 1132b13 to explain the concepts of loss (zēmia) and profit 
(kerdos). Aristotle also uses the term to describe barter in the Politics 
(1257a13,19) as well as to describe the exchanges between allies who do not live 
in one and the same polis (as described above in the elucidation of Aristotle’s 
term metadosis). The verb ἀλλάσσω is the term which most closely approximates 
what we understand by market exchange, though, in Nic. Eth., in contrast to 
Politics (Book I) and Plato’s Republic, Aristotle avoids standard words for 
trade/trader (emporia/emporos), retail/retailer (kapēlikē/kapēlos), buying 
(ōneomai) and selling (pōleō), and ‘clings to the neutral word ‘exchange’’, thus 
avoiding the connotation of commercial or market exchange (Finley, 1970, p. 
14). This choice of words would be that of one who aims to show that exchange 
is (or should be) embedded in the rules of communal justice (Finley, 1970, p. 8). 
 
The foregoing discussion of exchange highlights the capacious understanding of 
exchange which Aristotle treats. Part of the difficulty in interpreting Book V of 
the Ethics arises when one assumes that ‘exchange’, for Aristotle, corresponds to 
what one commonly understands by market exchange. In particular, the analysis 
of his terminology reveals the non-commercial senses of the term as used in Nic. 
Eth.. Had Aristotle wished to focus on purely ‘economic’ exchange, a different 
terminology stood at Aristotle’s disposal. Édouard Will (1954, p. 218) concurs 
with Gallagher (cited above) when he writes that exchange in Nic. Eth. ‘is 
situated within a more comprehensive scheme of social ethics’ than reference to 
commercial exchange would imply. Sitta von Reden (2003, p. 185) echoes the 
point when she states that Aristotle’s pronouncements in Nic. Eth. are ‘clearly 
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not statements on justice in the market place, but on justice in the social 
interaction between citizens’. Included in this social interaction is exchange in 
the sense of redistribution between citizens, and redistribution occurs, inter alia, 
in the realm of benefactions (liturgies) by the wealthy to communal activities 
and goals. Currency, as observed above, is essential in making items exchanged 
commensurable and hence in ensuring justice in exchange. But in light of this, 
it becomes clear that if a function of currency is to be singled out to be of 
particular import to Aristotle, it is that of a means of payment, whereby 









[2] I base translations of ancient Greek works on the translations given in the 
bibliography. Where I modify them, I have used the Greek versions available on 
the Perseus Digital Library: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper. 
 
[3] Translating χρεία as ‘need’ rather than ‘demand’ is argued for particularly 
well by Judson (1997, pp. 158-160), though see Danzig (2000, pp. 414-415). 
 
[4] See Wolfsdorf (2008) for further usages. 
 
[5] Many commentators identify hypotheses with existential statements 
(McKirahan, 1992, p. 43; Gómez-Lobo, 1976-77, p. 436). Aristotle is not 
consistent in applying the existential definition, as McKirahan (1992, p. 47) 
concedes; see also Barnes (1975, pp. 103-104) and Robinson (1953, pp. 100-103). 
 
[6] I draw on Strobach’s (2001, pp. 252-253) interpretation in what follows. 
 
[7] Alexander of Aphrodisias supplies a proof of the first proposition in his 
commentary on the Prior Analytics (386, 31-6) 
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[8] See Leszl (1981, p. 293). Also Robinson (1953, pp. 94-95, 105) for whom 
‘positing’ (τίθημι) ‘is deliberate in that it is consciously doing something which 
we need not do’. 
 
[9] Uses of ‘agreement’ to translate ἐξ ὑποθέσεως include the English 
translations of Nic. Eth. by Chase (1911), Crisp (2000), Rackham (1934), Ross 
rev. Brown (2009), Rowe (2002), Thomson (1976) and Welldon (1927). German 
translations likewise prefer the ‘agreement’ (Übereinkunft) translation, e.g. 
Rieckher (1856), Rolfes (1911), Stahr (1897), as do some Spanish translations 
which use the term ‘acuerdo’, e.g. Bonet (1985), Araujo and Marias (1970). 
‘Stipulation’ or ‘posit’ is used by Apostle (1984) and Irwin (1985), and 
‘presupposition’ by Bartlett and Collins (2011) as well as by Gigon (1967) who 
uses the term Voraussetzung. ‘By arbitrary usage’ comes from Ostwald’s 
translation. 
 
Those who use ‘convention’ include the English translators Peters (1909) and 
Warrington (1963) and the French translators Gauthier and Jolif (1970), Tricot 
(1990) and Voilquin (1961). Less common are translations which use the term 
‘hypothesis’, e.g. Bodéüs (1990) – ‘fixée par hypothèse’ – and Natali (1999) – ‘per 
ipotesi’. Natali, acknowledges the awkwardness of using ‘hypothesis’ (‘[i]n genera 
si traduce ex hupotheseos con ‘per convenzione’’) but defends the translation on 
etymological grounds.   
 
[10] For ‘convention’, the reader is referred to translations by Apostle, Araujo 
and Marias, Bodéüs, Bonet, Crisp, Gauthier and Jolif, Irwin, Peters, Rackham, 
Ross, Rowe, Thomson, Voilquin and Warrington. For ‘agreement’, see Bartlett 
and Collins, Chase, Gigon, Natali, Ostwald, Rolfes and Stahr. 
 
[11] See also Pol. (1275a10); [Const. Ath.] (LIX.6); de Ste. Croix (2004, pp. 328-
329). Plato uses the term συνθήκη in the sense of ‘collusion’ (Laws, 879a). 
 
[12] Xenophon (Cyr. 8.2.2) uses metadosis in this sense when he describes one of 
Cyrus’ methods of increasing his popularity, namely, giving a share (μετάδοσις) 
of food and drink to others. Robert Gallagher (forthcoming) translates 
metadosis, as it is used in the Nic. Eth. as ‘giving-of-a-share’ in order to denote 
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the particular type of reciprocity which Aristotle has in mind in his discussion 
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